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Article
From the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit-
ing “discrimination on the basis of sex” to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son (477 U.S. 57(1986)), lower courts were left to create 
and develop both the legal meaning of sex discrimination 
and the standards by which sex discrimination cases 
would be adjudicated. Scholars such as Catharine MacK-
innon have observed that because of the lack of legislative 
guidance on Title VII, it was the courts that truly shaped 
the legal standards governing sex discrimination in the 
workplace by responding to the reality of women’s experi-
ences in discrimination lawsuits. This is not particularly 
surprising: in the absence of clear guidance from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the circuits that make up the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals are regularly left to the task of statutory inter-
pretation and setting legal policy for their respective juris-
dictions. But why did some circuits lead the way while 
others were slower to develop doctrine? Was innovation 
driven by internal factors or external ones?
Drawing from these questions, this article looks at the 
evolving body of common law on sex discrimination that 
developed in the U.S. Courts of Appeals prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s adoption of a controlling legal frame-
work for evaluation of such claims under Title VII. While 
the disputes that the circuits hear on appeal are decidedly 
not representative of all claims, these cases are important 
because they establish precedent for the whole circuit and 
set forth a standard for lower courts to use in future 
claims.
Specifically, we investigate the development of work-
place sex discrimination doctrine during two periods of 
uncertainty in the law. The first period of doctrinal evolu-
tion occurred in the federal appellate courts between 
1964 and the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, which formally expanded the 
definition of sexual harassment to include “hostile work 
environment” but left other legal questions unanswered. 
The second period of interest includes cases decided after 
Meritor but before the Supreme Court’s 1993 ruling in 
Harris v. Forklift Systems (510 U.S. 17(1993)); this deci-
sion held that an abusive work environment does not have 
to cause tangible injury in order for a victim to bring a 
claim.
We proceed in the following fashion. First, we discuss 
the concept of policy diffusion and how it operates in the 
judicial context, and specifically in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals. We then explain how the role of the judiciary 
differed in the area of sexual harassment compared to 
other gender equality issues advocated by women’s rights 
groups during the same time period. With this discussion 
as a backdrop, we then set forth to test several hypotheses 
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about the relevant institutional, legal, and environmental 
factors that should influence a court’s adoption of the 
legal rule that sexual harassment is discrimination based 
on sex. We conclude by discussing what our findings tell 
us about the circumstances that most favored the advance-
ment of gender equality in the workplace. Central among 
these is the presence of female judges on the appellate 
bench.
Policy Diffusion in the Judicial 
Context
Policy diffusion, or the process by which a policy inno-
vation is disseminated to potential adopters, is well-
traveled territory in studies of policymaking. Policy 
innovations are simply new policy adoptions; the innova-
tion represents the first time a particular agency, legisla-
ture, or government has adopted or implemented a 
particular policy. That scholars have chosen to describe 
the spread of policy innovations as “diffusion” implies 
that governments or governmental units influence one 
another to adopt the new policy (Shipan and Volden 
2008). While most studies of policy diffusion are con-
ducted at the state level and focus on a legislature’s deci-
sion to adopt a particular policy innovation, there exists 
a substantial body of literature on the ways in which 
policy innovations—defined more specifically as new 
rules or doctrines—spread across court systems. Like 
studies of legislative policy adoption, most studies of 
judicial diffusion investigate the transmission of prece-
dent across state court systems (Caldeira 1985; Canon 
and Baum 1981; Lutz 1997; Savage 1985), although 
scholars are increasingly interested in explaining the 
same process at the federal appellate level (Klein 2002; 
Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Spill Solberg, Emrey, 
and Haire 2006).
In general, theories of policy diffusion center around 
three sets of determinants: internal, external, and policy-
specific characteristics. Internal determinants include 
such factors as institutional structures and characteristics, 
public opinion, demographic factors, ideology (of both 
government and the populace), and economic variables 
(Dye 1966; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Gray 
1973; Jacoby and Schneider 2001; Squire 1993; Walker 
1969). External factors typically taken into consideration 
include the influence of regional neighbors, federal insti-
tutions, or historical events (Berry and Berry 1992; Karch 
2004; Menzel and Feller 1997; Mooney 2001; Welch and 
Thompson 1980). Finally, most diffusion models include 
determinants specific to the policy innovation itself; for 
instance, studies of innovation in criminal justice policy 
might include measures of crime statistics specific to 
each unit under observation.
Despite some findings that suggest judicial diffusion 
differs significantly from the process for legislative 
policy adoption and diffusion (e.g., Canon and Baum 
1981; Lutz 1997; Savage 1985), there is evidence that the 
general determinants and mechanisms of diffusion do 
apply to the adoption of innovative doctrines across both 
state and federal appellate courts. The institutional struc-
tures and characteristics of specific courts, along with a 
well-developed system of judicial communication (via 
the publication of written opinions), have been particu-
larly cited as having a significant impact on the likelihood 
that a court will adopt a legal innovation.
Determinants of Judicial Diffusion
Using the standard model of diffusion, judicial scholars 
have investigated the adoption of precedent across state 
supreme courts, finding that the diffusion of precedent is 
inconsistent and does not conform to any standard pat-
tern. Instead, judicial diffusion appears to depend largely 
on internal determinants such as communication net-
works (e.g., legal reporting districts, citing doctrine in 
written opinions), cultural similarities (i.e., shared demo-
graphic profiles), and institutional structures and charac-
teristics (e.g., level of court professionalism, caseload, 
and court prestige) of the courts in question (Caldeira 
1985; Canon and Baum 1981; Kilwein and Brisbin 1997; 
Lutz 1997; Savage 1985).
The idea that the adoption of a new doctrine or prec-
edent is dependent upon internal determinants (and thus 
appears to be idiosyncratic) is not wholly inconsistent 
with the general findings in much of the diffusion lit-
erature. Recent findings by Volden (2006) suggest that 
geographic proximity, the typical measure of regional 
or neighborhood effects on policy diffusion, does not 
necessarily lead to policy emulation. Instead, policy 
diffusion is common across states that have similar 
demographic, political, and fiscal profiles. Accordingly, 
if judicial diffusion is indeed fairly idiosyncratic in 
nature, then it is likely that the judicial diffusion pro-
cess is significantly impacted not only by the institu-
tional characteristics of courts but also by socioeconomic 
variables and demands, which vary widely across 
states, regions, and time periods. Thus, the particular 
events of the time period under question, the needs of 
the population at various moments in time, and the 
characteristics of the very issue at question all should 
have increased significance in the judicial diffusion 
process.
Indeed, Canon and Baum (1981) suggest as much 
when they note that pre- to postwar changes in population 
size and urbanization had at least a minimal impact on the 
diffusion of judicial innovations. In the same vein, 
Kilwein and Brisbin (1997) also find that the characteris-
tics of the question at hand, in addition to court character-
istics, have an impact on the likelihood of adoption, 
noting that courts are most likely to adopt rules that favor 
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“have-nots,” or those who are disadvantaged, when they 
are dominated by Democratic, relatively liberal judges.
Mechanisms of Diffusion
In addition to studying the determinants of policy adop-
tion and diffusion, scholars have expanded their scope of 
research to examine the mechanisms of diffusion. Studies 
of state legislatures show that states are more likely to 
adopt policies that have been successful in other states; 
thus, it appears that states actively learn from the experi-
ences of their peers, waiting to adopt a policy until they 
are sure that policy will actually work (Shipan and 
Volden 2008; Volden 2006). Extending this logic to judi-
cial diffusion, researchers have documented a similar 
mechanism at work. Emulation appears to take place 
over the long term, as policy innovations and judicial 
meaning evolve to become commonly accepted (Glick 
1992, 1994; Glick and Hays 1991; Phillips and Grattet 
2000; Volden 2006). The process by which appellate 
courts develop the legal meaning of a concept in response 
to increasingly accepted judicial rhetoric can then be 
equated to policy learning (Phillips and Grattet 2000; 
Shipan and Volden 2008).
Just as Volden (2006) suggests that simply having a 
high proportion of adopting neighbors does not guarantee 
that a state will adopt a policy innovation, regional influ-
ence does not appear to have a significant impact on the 
likelihood that an innovation will be adopted by a given 
court (Canon and Baum 1981). This is likely due to two 
factors. First, the courts’ ability to adopt a precedent is 
dependent upon opportunity, or the actual supply of cases 
(Caldeira 1985; Canon and Baum 1981). No applicable 
case on the docket? No adoption. Second, the idea of 
regional neighborhood influence is too narrow for judi-
cial diffusion; the legal system has well-established chan-
nels of communication that do not rely on geographical 
proximity (Canon and Baum 1981; Lutz 1997). In fact, it 
is this system of written opinions and legal reporting that 
may be most responsible for the transmission of legal 
doctrine.1 For example, all federal appellate opinions des-
ignated for publication are included in the Federal 
Reporters (rather than being separated out into regional 
publications), so a panel of judges from the First Circuit 
arguably has easy access to the legal rules established by 
the Fifth Circuit. Additionally, the hierarchical arrange-
ment of courts within the federal system works to struc-
ture the patterns of diffusion. Courts that are lower in the 
hierarchy (e.g., trial courts, intermediate appellate courts) 
are bound by precedents established by their courts of last 
resort, and on matters of federal law, state courts are 
bound by federal court pronouncements. In the federal 
judiciary, the intermediate appellate courts are organized 
into regionally based “circuits”; each circuit cultivates its 
own body of precedent and, in the absence of Supreme 
Court guidance, can emulate or ignore other circuits’ 
legal innovations as it sees fit.
One might also expect that judicial diffusion may be 
slower than diffusion across legislatures or administrative 
institutions. There may be several reasons for this. First, 
judicial diffusion may be hampered by relative autonomy 
of courts (Kilwein and Brisbin 1997). This makes diffu-
sion most likely when a court has the institutional capacity 
to “receive, adapt, and implement the message about the 
establishment of a doctrine” (Kilwein and Brisbin 1997, 
132). Indeed, even those scholars who argue that there are 
no defined patterns of judicial diffusion emphasize the 
importance of communication between courts in the trans-
mission of legal precedent (Caldeira 1985; Comparato 
2002; Savage 1985). For example, Caldeira (1985) finds 
that courts are more likely to adopt a precedent from their 
peers when the two courts exist within the same regional 
communication channel (i.e., distance and legal reporting 
district). Consequently, it is likely that judicial diffusion is 
facilitated by policy learning, especially given the propen-
sity of courts to cite the decisions of other courts and 
judges as a way to justify their own decisions (Shapiro 
1970, 51; Spill Solberg, Emrey, and Haire 2006; Shipan 
and Volden 2008).
Diffusion across the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals
While most judicial diffusion studies involve the spread 
of doctrine and precedent across state court systems, 
Klein (2002) and Spill Solberg, Emrey, and Haire (2006) 
investigate the Courts of Appeals’ reactions to areas of 
law in which they do not have clear Supreme Court direc-
tion. In general, Klein (2002) argues that judges at the 
appellate level do not make decisions about adoption of 
a particular doctrine based on concerns about or anticipa-
tion of possible Supreme Court reaction; instead, judges 
are influenced by a number of other considerations, 
including their own ideological proximity to the rule 
under consideration as well as the legal prestige and 
expertise of the judge who originally authored the doc-
trine under consideration. Like Klein (2002), Spill 
Solberg, Emrey, and Haire (2006) find that circuits are 
more likely to adopt those new doctrines that were devel-
oped by circuits perceived to have policy expertise; this 
indicates that circuits cite those courts that frequently 
publish opinions in particular policy areas, or at least 
those who are willing to be first adopters (see also Walsh 
1997). However, they also note that circuits are likely to 
rely on their own legal capital when possible (Spill 
Solberg, Emrey, and Haire 2006, 286). These findings are 
consistent with those studies that note the importance of 
institutional characteristics in judicial diffusion (Caldeira 
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1985; Canon and Baum 1981). They also echo Shipan 
and Volden’s (2008) finding that smaller, less experi-
enced governmental institutions are more likely to adopt 
policy innovations in imitation of larger, more experi-
enced institutions.
Klein (2002) also discusses the importance of wide-
spread circuit acceptance of a rule; he finds that increased 
circuit support for a given rule heightens the probability 
that subsequent judges will adopt. This finding is under-
scored by another conclusion: that judges are less likely 
to adopt the doctrine in question when a previous ruling 
includes a dissent (Klein 2002). Taken together, the 
impact of widespread circuit acceptance and presence of 
a dissenting opinion indicate the judges want to be sure of 
the “success” (in this case, defined as legal viability or 
“settled” meaning) of a new rule (see also Phillips and 
Grattet 2000). Again, this mirrors the legislative diffusion 
process, as governments are more likely to adopt an inno-
vation that has already proven to be successful at some 
level (Volden 2006).
Similarly, Spill Solberg, Emrey, and Haire (2006) find 
that judges on the Courts of Appeals do seem to be influ-
enced by the decisions and opinions of other circuits. 
However, this effect happens over time; early in the pro-
cess of developing a new area of law, judges are more reli-
ant on the characteristics of their own circuits. This finding 
provides support for the idea that judicial diffusion is a 
slow process that is driven by policy learning: judges wait 
to adopt an innovative rule or doctrine until they are 
assured of its success and support across other circuits 
(Klein 2002; Phillips and Grattet 2000; Volden 2006). The 
authors also note that circuits are more likely to cite out-
side opinions when making decisions in cases involving 
particularly difficult issues (Spill Solberg, Emrey, and 
Haire 2006). The logic is simple: in such cases the circuit 
majority is seeking additional justification to enhance the 
legitimacy of its opinion (see also Walsh 1997).
Finally, because previous research has found that the 
adoption of legal rules is subject to the nature of the pol-
icy area, we turn our attention to the larger context of the 
women’s movement and the degree to which fighting 
sexual harassment was connected to this movement’s 
policy goals.
Gender Equality, Sexual 
Harassment, and the Courts
Unlike other types of sex discrimination claims (e.g., 
equal pay, support for working mothers, fairness in hiring 
and promotion), sexual harassment did not start out as an 
issue championed by the women’s rights movement. In 
her essay “The Logic of Experience” (reprinted in her 
2007 edited volume), Catharine MacKinnon observes, 
“Social movements did not first define the issue of sexual 
harassment in the public mind to the degree that the 
courts did” (p. 165). Instead, sexual harassment became 
a cognizable legal claim through the uncoordinated deci-
sions of individual women who believed that their 
employment should not be conditioned on their perfor-
mance of sexual favors (quid pro quo harassment) or 
their acquiescence to pervasive verbal, physical, and 
psychological abuse (hostile environment harassment). 
These decisions exemplify the way in which legal mobi-
lization can infuse private litigation with political sig-
nificance (Jacob 1969).
Visible and audible, as an injured party, someone with 
relevant information, a woman could, at the least, 
make a man look bad, perhaps cost him a great 
deal. . . . With women no longer absorbing the entire 
cost of this conduct in private, sexual politics went 
public, shifting the ground of political convention 
and becoming a visible part of politics as 
usual. . . . Fundamentally, sexual harassment law 
transformed what was a moral foible (if that) into a 
legal injury to equality rights. (MacKinnon 2007, 185)
This perspective on the courts’ contribution to gender 
equality in the workplace views judicial creativity in a 
positive light, heralding the advantages of “bottom-up” 
policy development by courts as opposed to “top-down” 
policymaking by legislative bodies. In particular, 
MacKinnon argues that features of the common law deci-
sion-making process—extrapolating broader principles 
from a set of facts and applying them to similar facts—
was helpful to women in this case. Rather than being 
defined in the abstract by a legislative body or an advo-
cacy group, legal recognition of sexual harassment as dis-
crimination came about in an incremental process shaped 
by women’s lived experiences with discrimination.
While MacKinnon (2007) heralds the role of the courts 
in addressing the social and legal implications of sexual 
harassment, other scholars argue that the courts were only 
allowed to act because of social and political develop-
ments occurring outside the judiciary. In these accounts, 
the process by which the courts addressed sexual harass-
ment was a culmination of multiple events that were brew-
ing in the political and institutional environments well 
before the first official judicial recognition of the problem. 
For example, Zippel (2006) provides a narrative of the 
evolution of sexual harassment policy in the United States, 
noting that the courts were spurred to action by the con-
vergence of two key events: the social mobilization of the 
second-wave women’s movement, including the con-
scious decision to address the growing problem of “sexual 
harassment” and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s (EEOC’s) decision to file an amicus brief 
in support of a plaintiff claiming sex-based discrimination 
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(Corne v. Bausch & Lomb 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Arizona), 
1975)). Others have argued that because the courts devel-
oped sexual harassment precedent in response to social 
and political activity, this created a restrictive definition of 
sexual harassment, a narrow definition that focuses too 
much on sexual abuse as popularly understood and not 
enough on harassment based on gender discrimination and 
mistreatment (Schultz 1998).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also 
played a role in the conceptualization of sexual harass-
ment as a violation of workplace anti-discrimination poli-
cies. In particular, the EEOC’s contribution to legal 
innovation primarily occurred through its activities as a 
rule-making body and through its decisions to file amicus 
curiae briefs in federal court.2 With respect to rulemaking, 
in 1980, the EEOC (under the direction of Eleanor Holmes 
Norton) issued its first set of guidelines describing sexual 
harassment as a type of discrimination based on sex pro-
hibited by Title VII. In these guidelines, the EEOC noted 
that “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature” all constituted sexual harassment, whether they 
were directly connected to quid pro quo harassment or 
with harassment that had “the purpose or effect of unrea-
sonably interfering with an individual’s work perfor-
mance,” thereby “creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment” (29 CFR 1604.11(a)). 
The Supreme Court explicitly drew upon this language in 
Meritor v. Vinson, though it rejected the EEOC’s proposed 
scheme of employer liability as raised in their amicus brief 
(Anderson 1987). The EEOC also filed amicus briefs in 
early cases such as Bundy v. Jackson (641 F.2d 934 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981)) and Henson v. City of Dundee (682 F.2d 897 
(11th Cir. 1982)) and intervened on behalf of the plaintiffs 
in a Ninth Circuit hostile environment case, EEOC v. 
Hacienda Hotel (881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Of course, legal developments in sexual harassment 
doctrine would likely not have happened without judges 
who were willing to innovate in the absence of legal guid-
ance from the Supreme Court or Congress, attorneys who 
were willing to push the envelope with novel legal argu-
ments, and plaintiffs who understood their treatment at 
work as an injury deserving of legal redress and were will-
ing to take on the various costs of litigation.3 Discusses the 
obstacles that early plaintiffs had to surmount even after 
they decided they wanted to litigate. Central among these 
was finding attorneys willing to argue for an expanded 
definition of sex discrimination law, since the plaintiffs 
were not “repeat players” in the litigation process 
(Galanter 1974).4
In sum, by naming and recognizing the problems faced 
by women in the workplace (problems that were not 
being adequately addressed by existing employment dis-
crimination laws), these plaintiffs, attorneys, and judges 
served as “critical actors” for the larger cause of gender 
equality, even if their efforts were not coordinated. Childs 
and Krook (2006, 528) define critical actors as “those 
who initiate policy proposals on their own . . . and 
embolden others to take steps to promote policies for 
women.” Because of the important role that precedent 
plays in a common law system, the significance of the 
first few appellate cases to recognize sexual harassment 
went beyond victory for the plaintiffs involved. As favor-
able precedent began to emerge in a few circuits, judges 
in other circuits had more “legal capital”5 available to 
them when facing these novel claims themselves. While 
appellate judges are not bound by precedent from circuits 
other than their own, they often look to other courts’ 
examples when their circuit has not established a clear 
rule (Klein 2002).
Theoretical Framework
Given the reactive, not proactive, nature of the judicial 
institution, we argue that both internal and external fac-
tors affected the timing of each circuit’s first decision 
interpreting Title VII to prohibit hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment. These initial decisions are 
important, not because they represent all of the sexual 
harassment claims filed in court (they do not), but 
because they established circuit-wide precedent in the 
absence of any Supreme Court precedent on sexual 
harassment.6 The literature suggests three sets of expla-
nations for policy adoption that can be broadly classified 
as legal, institutional, and environmental in nature.
Legal Factors
Miller and Sarat (1980-1981, 544) describe the dispute 
resolution pyramid as having several stages, with smaller 
numbers at each subsequent level: injury, grievance, 
claim, dispute, resort to lawyers, and filing. For a case to 
appear before a circuit court, we add another step to the 
process: an appeal. Prior to the passage of Title VII, there 
were almost certainly many “injuries” in the form of 
sexual harassment in the workplace, but as the concept of 
“sexual harassment” per se was not understood as such 
(MacKinnon 2007). However, once legislation that 
banned “discrimination based on sex” was in place, this 
provided legal grounds for women to articulate a griev-
ance: they were being treated unfairly by their employers 
because of their sex.
Thus, the opportunity for federal appeals courts to rule 
on sexual harassment is, first, dependent upon the pres-
ence of relevant disputes. We conceptualize this “oppor-
tunity” as including the time elapsed after the passage of 
Title VII.7 This allows time both for cases to make their 
way through the court system and for circuits to seek out 
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signals from other courts prior to adopting a new rule 
(Klein 2002; Phillips and Grattet 2000; Volden 2006). In 
addition, the presence of available “legal capital” (Spill 
Solberg, Emrey, and Haire 2006), such as existing circuit 
precedent or other circuits’ precedent, may explain the 
timing of a court’s decision. One potential source of prec-
edent available to courts is the existing precedent inter-
preting Title VII as prohibiting “racial harassment” as 
part of “discrimination based on race.” These cases first 
explicated the concept of an “abusive” or “hostile” envi-
ronment, language later picked up in the sexual harass-
ment cases, detailing how constant slurs, taunting, and 
the like constituted “discrimination based on race.” 
Because judges engage in analogical reasoning as they 
search for relevant legal authorities to guide their deci-
sions (Sunstein 1993), similarities between a racially and 
sexually hostile environment might inform a court’s deci-
sion to recognize a hostile work environment in the sex-
ual harassment context.8
Likewise, if a court had previously ruled on a quid pro 
quo sexual harassment case, this would be a source of 
“in-house” legal capital available to help formulate a new 
rule on hostile environment discrimination (and would 
allow for a relatively smaller, more incremental shift in 
policy). In addition to looking to other circuits, the par-
ticipation of organized interests via amicus curiae briefs 
can provide legal arguments as well as ideological cues 
that hasten adoption (Martinek 2006). Finally, because of 
the structure of the federal judicial hierarchy, it should be 
expected that relevant stare decisis from the Supreme 
Court should hasten a circuit’s adoption of a legal rule. 
Two Supreme Court decisions on sexual harassment were 
handed down between 1965 and 1994: Meritor Savings v. 
Vinson (1986) and Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993). It 
should be noted that Meritor was not dispositive on the 
issue of sexual harassment, as it left open several impor-
tant issues that were later clarified by Harris. For this rea-
son, we include cases decided both before and after 
Meritor, though we expect that circuits will be more 
likely to adopt the hostile environment standard after 
Meritor was handed down in 1986.
Institutional Factors
In addition to legal factors, a substantial body of research 
has acknowledged the importance of the institutional 
context in shaping circuit court outcomes, particularly 
panel- and circuit-level influences (e.g., Cohen 2002; 
Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006). Of these, the 
ideological preferences of the court have been identified 
as having a substantial effect (Kastellec 2007; Tiller and 
Cross 1999). We expect that the preferences of the cir-
cuit, as measured by its median ideology, will affect 
when a court will adopt a hostile environment rule. 
Likewise, we expect that the preferences of the panel 
hearing the case will be related to adoption, with more 
liberal panels being more likely to adopt than more con-
servative panels (Kilwein and Brisbin 1997).9
The timing of adoption may also be driven by the 
Courts of Appeals’ status as an intermediate appellate 
court under the Supreme Court’s direction. It is possible 
that a circuit may be responding to recent oversight and 
correction by the Supreme Court, in the form of reversals. 
While the degree to which the Supreme Court acts as an 
effective principal is quite limited due to the small frac-
tion of cases it accepts each year (Lindquist, Haire, and 
Songer 2007), a circuit might be less likely to innovate if 
it had recently sustained a number of reversals. 
Additionally, innovation might be affected by the degree 
to which the circuit and the Supreme Court are ideologi-
cally congruent, with circuits more willing to take “risks” 
when conditions at the Supreme Court appear favorable 
(but see Klein 2002).
Finally, the likelihood of circuit adoption of a hostile 
environment rule may be influenced by the presence of 
a female judge. A growing body of empirical research 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals supports this expectation 
in employment discrimination cases. Peresie (2005) 
finds that in cases involving claims of sexual harass-
ment or sex discrimination, plaintiffs double their 
chances of a favorable decision when the panel includes 
a female judge. Songer, Davis, and Haire (1994) note 
that women judges make relatively more liberal deci-
sions when it comes to claims of employment discrimi-
nation. Finally, Boyd, Epstein, and Martin (2010) find 
that women judges have both an individual and panel 
impact when it comes to judging sex discrimination 
cases; specifically, male judges who serve with a woman 
on a panel in such cases are more likely to rule in favor 
of the plaintiff.10 Following this literature, we expect 
that the presence of a female judge should increase the 
likelihood that a court will adopt a hostile environment 
standard.
Environmental Factors
The remaining set of factors that are likely to affect the 
timing of innovation can be found not in the law or in the 
federal judiciary, but in the environments in which the 
circuits are situated. Regional characteristics of the cir-
cuit, such as the proportion of women in the workforce, 
citizen liberalism, and litigiousness, may affect both the 
“supply” of lawsuits and the willingness of judges to 
respond with a new legal standard. The public awareness 
of sexual harassment arguably increased greatly after 
1991, due to the volume of news coverage of the 
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the Tailhook 
scandal. However, these events do not affect our analysis 
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because the last circuit to adopt a hostile environment 
interpretation did so in 1989.
Research Design
In this article, we are seeking to explain innovations by 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the absence of controlling 
Supreme Court precedent on sexual harassment law. 
Specifically, we look at each time a circuit explicitly 
noted that “discrimination based on sex” included the 
creation of a sexually hostile or abusive work environ-
ment (“first adoptions”).11 We also examine subsequent 
clarifications of the standard in cases that followed first 
adoption cases. We allow for multiple “adoptions” by a 
circuit because fact patterns vary across cases and courts 
are constrained by the cases brought to them. For exam-
ple, after the first time a circuit recognized hostile envi-
ronment harassment, subsequent decisions might clarify 
questions about liability, the severity of harassment 
needed for an actionable claim, and the vantage point 
from which objectionable behavior is assessed.
In terms of the opportunity to make policy, we identify 
two “windows” in which these decisions occurred. The 
first window exists after the passage of Title VII in 1965 
and before the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Meritor 
Savings v. Vinson. In Meritor, the Court ruled that Title 
VII was not limited to sex discrimination of an “economic 
character,” that the correct standard for review was 
whether the behavior was “unwelcome,” and that trial 
courts should consider the “totality of the circumstances” 
rather than evaluating each incident in isolation. Prior to 
1986, five circuits had adopted a hostile environment rule.
The second window spans the time between Meritor 
and the Supreme Court’s second sexual harassment case, 
Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993). Harris clarified the ref-
erence point for determining whether behavior was offen-
sive (the “reasonable person” standard)12 and emphasized 
that to have an actionable claim, plaintiffs must show that 
the conduct was “more than a mere utterance” while not 
requiring the conduct to cause a “nervous breakdown.” 
Between Meritor and Harris, the remainder of the cir-
cuits adopted the policy, with the last court (the Ninth 
Circuit) adopting in 1989.
To explain the timing of each circuit’s adoption of the 
hostile environment interpretation of Title VII, we utilize 
a Cox proportional hazards model. Duration analysis is 
particularly useful for the study of policy innovation and 
diffusion, as the main line of inquiry involves speculation 
on both the circumstances that contribute to policy adop-
tion and the timing of individual adoptions. Duration 
models account for the possibility that individual subjects 
observed in multiple time periods might “fail” by suc-
cumbing to some event (in this case, adopting a standard 
for the adjudication of sexual harassment claims).13 
Among the survival time methods, the Cox proportional 
hazards model is used here because it requires no assump-
tion regarding the model distribution, which comports 
well with diffusion theory (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
1997; Gray 1973; Rogers 1962).14 Because our data 
include multiple adoptions by individual circuits, we esti-
mate a multiple events Cox model; this allows for the fact 
that a given circuit experienced the same event (i.e., 
adoption of a standard) more than once during the time 
period under question. The variance corrected model uti-
lizes robust standard errors with observations clustered 
by circuit; the data are stratified by event, or the order in 
which adoptions occurred.15
Dependent Variable
We conceptualize our dependent variable as each time a 
circuit adopted, clarified, or expanded a hostile environ-
ment standard in a case. To identify the instances in 
which a circuit adopted or expanded the hostile environ-
ment standard, we generated a list of cases via the 
Westlaw database, using the search terms sexual harass-
ment, Title VII, and hostile environment.16 This produced 
the universe of published opinions for the eleven num-
bered circuits and the District of Columbia; from these, 
trained coders content analyzed all sexual harassment 
cases decided by each circuit between 1965 and 1993. A 
case was designated as an “adoption” (coded as a 1) 
based on explicit language in the majority opinion stating 
that the court was expanding the definition of sex dis-
crimination to include a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment or that it was clarifying its hostile environment rule.
Independent Variables
To account for the role of institutional factors in explain-
ing policy adoption, we included several variables related 
to the court’s policy preferences and decision-making 
tendencies. As a measure of circuit ideological prefer-
ences, we used the circuit median ideology variable from 
the Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007). 
These scores are calculated based on the NOMINATE 
Common Space scores (Poole 1998; Poole and Rosenthal 
1997) and range from –1 (most liberal) to +1 (most con-
servative). In this issue area, more liberal circuits should 
have a greater likelihood of adoption compared to conser-
vative courts because of their policy preferences related to 
women’s rights. Another variable captures aspects of 
policy preferences at the panel level. The panel ideology 
variable is the median of the Judicial Common Space 
scores for the three members of the panel hearing the 
case. As with circuit preferences variable, if a majority of 
the panel holds relatively liberal policy preferences, we 
should expect them to be more likely than a conservative 
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panel to expand the definition of sex discrimination to 
include hostile environment harassment. Third, because 
previous work has found that the degree of ideological 
cohesion within a court influences the extent to which a 
panel will cite caselaw from another circuit (Spill Solberg, 
Emrey, and Haire 2006), we also included a lagged esti-
mate of circuit dissensus that is a moving three-year aver-
age of the dissent rate in each circuit.17
Additionally, the presence of female judges as “critical 
actors” who help promote an understanding of sex dis-
crimination (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010) might has-
ten the adoption of a hostile environment rule. We test 
this expectation with a dummy variable that indicates 
whether there was a woman judge serving on the panel 
hearing the case (coded 1 if there was at least one woman 
and 0 if there were no women).18
Within the judicial hierarchy, the relationship between 
a given circuit and the Supreme Court might also influ-
ence a panel’s decision about whether and when to inno-
vate. To account for this relationship, we include variables 
that tap into the degree of oversight a circuit has received 
and also the degree to which a circuit shares the policy 
preferences of the Supreme Court. For the former vari-
able, we calculated a lagged reversal rate using the Spaeth 
Supreme Court data set, using the raw number of rever-
sals in the previous year divided by the total number of 
terminations on the merits.19 To account for ideological 
congruence (or lack thereof) between a circuit and the 
Supreme Court, we calculated the distance between the 
Supreme Court and the circuit median using the Judicial 
Common Space scores, then took the absolute value.
Several variables related to environmental explana-
tions for diffusion were obtained from the U.S. census. 
As a rough indicator of the “opportunity” for sexual 
harassment lawsuits, we calculated the proportion of 
women in the civilian workforce for each circuit. While a 
yearly figure would be more sensitive to changes in 
workforce demographics, these data are only available in 
the census reports, so we used the 1970 data for 1965-
1970, the 1980 data for 1971-1980, the 1990 data for 
1981-1990, and the 2000 data for 1991-1993. Additionally, 
to account for the relative levels of litigiousness within 
each circuit, we utilize the population density averaged 
across all states in the circuit.20 Previous scholarship has 
found that greater levels of social complexity are related 
to more litigation (Yates, Davis, and Glick 2001; 
Harrington and Ward 1995). We also control for the pos-
sibility that citizen ideology influences the relative liti-
giousness of a circuit by including the Berry et al. (1998) 
measure of citizen liberalism, which ranges from 0 (con-
servative) to 100 (liberal).
The legal capital variables were coded directly from 
the cases and Westlaw search results. The number of pre-
vious appellate sexual harassment cases was summed to 
provide a “count” of available legal capital across all cir-
cuits. To account for intracircuit legal capital, we also 
included a dummy variable equal to 1 if the circuit had 
previously acknowledged quid pro quo harassment as a 
violation of Title VII. The use of racial harassment prec-
edents was coded as a 1 if the court cited such a case in 
any way and a 0 if not. Finally, drawing from the litera-
ture on “policy entrepreneurs” as well as recent findings 
on the influence of amicus curiae briefs (Collins 2007), 
we control for the presence of an amicus brief as a proxy 
for the participation of a policy entrepreneur (Martinek 
2006).21 For example, discussions of sexual harassment 
law often mention interventions by attorneys represent-
ing women’s rights groups, such as Nadine Taub of 
Rutgers’ Women’s Rights Litigation or the EEOC.
Analysis
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission began 
collecting data on Title VII sexual harassment charges in 
1990.22 Unfortunately, these data were not collected by 
the EEOC throughout the entire period of our study and 
as such, cannot be included in our multivariate analysis, 
but they do provide us some insight on variation in the 
number of reported incidences of sexual harassment in the 
workplace. “Charges” refers to reports filed with the 
EEOC and does not reflect whether the EEOC determined 
that there was reasonable cause or whether the claim was 
ultimately successful. Rather, we consider “charges” as an 
indicator of awareness of sexual harassment and as a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for a grievance to 
become a lawsuit (Miller and Sarat 1980-1981).
In the period between 1990 and 1994, there is a size-
able jump across all states after the year of the Thomas 
confirmation hearings and the Tailhook scandal in 1991; 
the average number of charges increases from 65 in 1990 
to 110 in 1992. The rising trend then continues in subse-
quent years. Across circuits, after adjusting for popula-
tion size, the District of Columbia circuit has the highest 
average number of charges during this time period, fol-
lowed by two of the southern circuits (the Fifth and the 
Eleventh). At the lower end of the range, the Ninth and 
the First circuits, respectively, have .06 and .02 charges 
per 1,000 residents. The number of charges is moderately 
and positively correlated with the population of a state 
(r =.72) and the number of women in the civilian work-
force (r = .54), so we can be reasonably confident that 
even without a direct measure of the number of charges, 
including these two variables allows us to tap into the 
“supply” side of litigation. (See the appendix for tables 
detailing this information at http://prq.sagepub.com/
supplemental/.)
Turning next to the adoptions data, across circuits, no 
regional trends appear to explain the order in which 
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adoption occurred. 23 There were a total of fifty-six pub-
lished cases where adoptions occurred during this time 
period. The Seventh Circuit (comprising Illinois, 
Wisconsin, and Indiana) led the way with twelve cases, 
about two standard deviations above the mean (6.8), 
while the First Circuit (Maine, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) and the Third Circuit 
(Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware) tied for the 
fewest number of cases (two). Women were the plaintiffs 
alleging sexual harassment in all of the cases included in 
our study. A little over half of the cases (54 percent, or 
thirty cases) yielded outcomes that were clearly favorable 
to the female plaintiff. In addition, 8.9 percent of cases 
(five) yielded mixed outcomes, meaning that the female 
plaintiff won on at least some of her claims. The remain-
ing 38 percent of cases were resolved in favor of the 
employer. This tells us that while a court’s adoption was 
not uniformly beneficial for the women bringing their 
claims to court, in about two-thirds of the cases, most 
female plaintiffs were at least somewhat successful.
The results of the Cox proportional hazards model are 
displayed in Table 1. Because there was not enough vari-
ance to analyze the first time window of 1965-1986 sepa-
rately, the results shown in the first column include the 
years of 1965 to 1993, along with a dummy variable to 
flag cases decided after Meritor v. Vinson. The results 
shown in the second column reflect only post-Meritor 
cases through 1993.24 Throughout the entire period (and 
in both models), institutional and legal factors had the 
greatest and most significant impact on a circuit’s deci-
sion to adopt the hostile or abusive work environment 
standard. Only one of the variables representing environ-
mental factors achieved statistical significance: citizen 
ideology. Contrary to expectations, circuits located in 
more conservative regions were approximately 4 percent 
to 6 percent more likely to adopt the hostile environment 
standard than other circuits. Neither of the other variables 
that captured the “supply” side of litigation (women in 
the labor force and population density) was statistically 
significant, though this is likely due to the lack of vari-
ance in the census measures.
With regard to institutional factors during the 1964-
1993 period, characteristics of the panel hearing the case 
emerged as more influential than characteristics related to 
the court as a whole. While circuit ideology had no effect, 
panels comprised of more liberal judges were more likely 
to adopt the hostile environment standard. This is consis-
tent with earlier work that finds that liberal judges are 
more likely to adopt legal standards that favor disadvan-
taged parties (Kilwein and Brisbin 1997). Interestingly, 
the gender composition of the panel yielded a much larger 
substantive impact on adoption, even after controlling for 
ideology; panels were three times more likely to adopt a 
hostile environment rule when a female judge was present 
compared to cases heard by only male judges. This mea-
sure has the second largest effect of any independent vari-
able in the model, including Supreme Court precedent.
Looking at the variables that tap into the dynamics of 
innovation within a judicial hierarchy, it appears that cir-
cuits were making legal policy without being constrained 
by concerns about sanctioning from the Supreme Court. 
When cases from both the pre- and post-Meritor periods 
are included, we see that reversals were not significant 
predictors of adoption; moreover, in the post-Meritor 
model, a circuit’s reversal rate was negatively related to 
adoption of the hostile environment standard. In both 
models, greater ideological distance from the Supreme 
Court actually increased the likelihood of adoption—a 
finding inconsistent with the argument that ideologically 
“extreme” circuits curbed their innovations out of con-
cerns that the Supreme Court would alter their preferred 
rule. Taken together, it appears that the intermediate 
appellate courts were only minimally responsive to the 
threat of reversal, and then only after the Supreme Court 
had provided some indication of its preferences on the 
issue of sexual harassment. The final circuit-level control 
variable, workload, was significantly related to adoption 
in both models (hazard ratio = .99). Circuits that led the 
way in adoption tended to be those with a slightly smaller 
caseload, perhaps because they had more available time 
to spend on innovations.
The availability of legal capital from other circuits 
emerged as the most important legal factor to influence 
adoption in both models. As expected, the citation of sex-
ual harassment precedent from other circuits increased 
the likelihood of adoption of the hostile or abusive work 
environment standard; circuits that cited existing sexual 
harassment precedent from other courts were nearly three 
times more likely to adopt their own rule. While panels 
are not bound by the decisions of other circuits, the cita-
tion of these other rulings provides support for a policy 
learning account of diffusion, namely, that panels legiti-
mized their decisions by pointing to “successful” doctri-
nal innovations in other jurisdictions. In contrast, there 
was not evidence of widespread reliance on racial harass-
ment doctrine; citations to these analogous cases were 
limited to just a few opinions. Contrary to our expecta-
tions, the existence of intracircuit precedent on quid pro 
quo harassment had a small, negative effect on adoption 
and clarification of the hostile environment standard, but 
only in the post-Meritor period. While we can only spec-
ulate as to why this happened, courts were consistently 
willing to rely on out-of-circuit precedent when they 
adopted or clarified the hostile environment rule through-
out the entirety of the period studied; perhaps after 
Meritor, there were simply fewer appeals in circuits that 
had already recognized one type of sexual harassment 
(i.e., quid pro quo). The amicus variable also failed to 
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achieve statistical significance, underscoring the signifi-
cance of legal arguments raised by plaintiffs’ attorneys 
rather than a well-organized and -financed concerted 
effort by women’s rights groups as third parties.25
After the Supreme Court’s first sexual harassment rul-
ing in Meritor v. Vinson, we see a statistically significant 
but substantively negligible effect on the likelihood of 
adoption. The coefficient tells us that this is a negative 
effect, but the size of the effect is quite small. This is also 
fairly common in studies of policy diffusion, as a period 
of early innovation is followed by a surge in adoption that 
marginally recedes as individual adopters pause to evalu-
ate and review the changing policy landscape (Glick and 
Hays 1991; Walker 1969).
Discussion
In this analysis, we hypothesized that the timing of cir-
cuit adoption of a hostile environment standard would be 
contingent on institutional, legal, and environmental fac-
tors. Of these, internal determinants related to institu-
tional and legal variables were the strongest explanatory 
factors, underscoring the utility of an integrated model of 
appellate court decision making (Songer and Haire 
1992). Panel ideology was a driving force for adoption, 
and throughout the entire time period, ideologically dis-
tant courts were more likely to adopt or clarify their 
standards. These findings suggest that courts were not 
anticipating or responding to the Supreme Court’s prefer-
ences in the timing of their decisions, but rather were 
following their own preferences. This is not altogether 
surprising, given the limited ability (and willingness) of 
the Supreme Court to monitor the lower courts on all 
developing legal issues. Klein (2002, 126) observed, 
from his interviews with circuit court judges, “the 
Supreme Court’s potential actions may sometimes enter 
into circuit judges’ thinking but are not a major influence 
on their decisions.” His interpretation is consistent with 
our findings here. The significance of ideological impact 
in our model is also consistent with previous literature 
(Kilwein and Brisbin 1997) suggesting that judges with 
more liberal policy preferences are more likely to issue 
rulings that favor groups that traditionally have been 
victims of discrimination.
In addition to the ideological composition of the panel, 
the gender composition of the panel was strongly associ-
ated with the adoption of the hostile environment standard. 
Adoption was three times more likely when a panel con-
tained a woman—a striking result given the paucity of the 
women on the bench during this time period (1965-1993). 
Two perspectives from the literature provide insight on this 
result. First, scholars in the substantive representation 
Table 1. Factors Influencing Adoption of Standards for Sexual Harassment Cases: Cox Proportional Hazards Models
Model 1 (1965-1993) Model 2 (1987-1993)
Variable Coefficient RSE Hazard ratio Coefficient RSE Hazard ratio
Circuit ideology −1.47 1.31 0.23 −2.16 1.49 0.115
Ideological distance from Supreme Court 2.23*** 0.70 9.33 2.23** 1.13 9.28
Lagged reversal rate −5.41 6.93 0.00 −15.60* 9.02 0
Population density in circuit 0.00 0.00 1.00 −0.00 0.00 0.10
Percentage 2omen in workforce (circuit) −3.55 5.37 0.03 −7.57* 5.29 0.00
Citizen ideology of circuit −0.03** 0.01 0.97 −0.06*** 0.02 0.94
Sexual harassment precedent from other circuits 0.86** 0.37 2.37 0.91*** 0.39 2.48
Circuit previously adopted quid pro quo standard −0.68 0.52 0.51 −1.93*** 0.63 0.14
Cites racial harassment precedent −0.12 0.44 0.89 0.29 0.71 1.33
Amicus brief 0.38 0.37 1.46 0.52 0.53 1.68
Female judge on panel 1.23*** 0.46 3.41 1.39** 0.57 4.02
Panel ideology −3.61*** 1.14 0.027 −5.47*** 1.20 0.00
Circuit workload −0.02** 0.006 0.985 −0.02* 0.01 0.98
Lagged dissent rate 7.66 4.69 3153 9.81 8.17 18,27
Meritor v. Vinson 35.34** 16.30 0.00 −– —
Log pseudo-likelihood –88.47 –67.87
 Circuits = 12
Total observations = 348
Failures = 56
Circuits = 12
Total observations = 84
Failures = 42
Results of a Cox proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates, using the Breslow method for ties. Hazard ratios greater than one 
indicate a positive relationship; hazard ratios less than one indicate a negative relationship.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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literature have argued that rather than focusing on the raw 
numbers or proportion of women in political institutions, 
we should instead focus on “critical actors” who were 
instrumental in promoting policies that are beneficial for 
women (Childs and Krook 2006). Here, we see evidence 
that female judges in the 1970s and 1980s were behaving 
as “critical actors,” at least in terms of sexual harassment 
law. This should not be surprising, given that the few 
women who were federal judges during this era likely 
faced hostility or isolation as trailblazers in their profes-
sion. For example, both Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg have described numerous personal experi-
ences with gender discrimination in their legal careers dur-
ing this same time period (Bazelon 2007). Of course, we 
should be cautious in generalizing about the effect of 
female judges to other time periods, as the female compo-
sition of the federal bench likely reflects the appointment 
goals of particular presidents and may not necessarily 
translate to pro-woman outcomes in other areas of the law.
Second, recent research on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
has documented significant differences in outcomes 
between mixed-gender panels and all-male panels in 
cases involving sex discrimination (for a review of the 
literature see Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010). Even after 
controlling for ideology, we find that the presence of 
female judges exerts a liberalizing tendency on male 
judges in terms of support for plaintiffs. However, our 
findings go beyond previous work; here, female judges 
are associated with the creation of a legal rule favorable 
to women, not just casting a pro-plaintiff vote. Although 
we do not fully understand the causal mechanism behind 
this effect, it provides support for Catharine MacKinnon’s 
assertion that sexual harassment law is indeed women’s 
common law; the judges on the bench at this time shaped 
the contours of precedent that acknowledged the realities 
of workplace discrimination.
Legal capital played an important role in the adop-
tion of the hostile environment standard. To bolster 
their decisions, adopting courts were more likely to cite 
precedent on sexual harassment from other circuits. 
This result echoes those of previous studies that have 
found diffusion to be a process largely driven by policy 
learning (Shipan and Volden 2008; Volden 2006). 
Research on state courts suggests that they prefer to 
delay adoption of a specific policy until their peers sig-
nal a willingness to develop or change that legal stan-
dard (Glick 1992, 1994; Glick and Hays 1991; Phillips 
and Grattet 2000). It also comports well with findings 
that circuits are more likely to adopt new doctrines that 
have already been tacitly endorsed by at least one of 
their peers (Klein 2002; Spill Solberg, Emrey, and 
Haire 2006). As in most cases of policy innovation, 
each institution is hesitant to be the first adopter, but 
once an innovation is introduced, circuits are more 
likely to become interested in shaping and molding the 
new policy.
In conclusion, our findings highlight the degree to 
which the “policy laboratory” concept, usually used in 
the context of state policymaking, applies to the develop-
ment of the law occurs in the lower federal courts. The 
Supreme Court’s first intervention in sexual harassment 
law came a full nine years after the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia recognized the claims of 
Paulette Barnes in her suit against her employer, the 
Environmental Protection Agency. The innovation of the 
lower federal courts in interpreting “discrimination based 
on sex” to include a hostile work environment paved the 
way for a national standard that now protects men and 
women in the workplace.
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Notes
 1. It is worth noting that the widespread use of electronic data-
bases (such as Westlaw) for legal research by clerks and 
judges may have changed this particular mechanism for 
judicial diffusion.
 2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
guidelines were merely interpretations of Title VII and not 
legally binding, though appellate courts in some cases chose 
to adopt their approach as controlling (e.g., Bundy v. 
Jackson 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
 3. Interviews with judges have revealed that they hold differ-
ent conceptions of their role (Gibson 1978; Howard 1981; 
Klein 2002), which also explains the willingness of certain 
judges to act as “innovators.” However, when faced with an 
issue of first impression, arguably judges are more or less 
forced to be innovators.
 4. Early plaintiffs found attorneys from two kinds of social 
networks. Family and friends were more likely to recom-
mend a generalist attorney (without political ties to the 
women’s movement), while plaintiffs who connected with 
politically active attorneys or bystanders were more often 
referred to attorneys who specialized in civil rights law or 
that had the backing of organizations like the Women’s Legal 
Defense Fund that could provide resources. Both types of 
attorneys had success, however.
 5. Legal capital is best defined as information gleaned from 
existing legal precedent; judges may rely on this informa-
tion when crafting new decisions. For a more detailed dis-
cussion, see Landes and Posner (1976) and Caldeira (1985).
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 6. Our focus is exclusively on published opinions because of 
their precedential weight, particularly during this time period.
 7. Duration analysis, the statistical approach applied here, 
accounts for elapsed time, thereby making it unnecessary to 
add additional control variables for time.
 8. For example, in the sexual harassment case Bundy v. 
Jackson (641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)), the panel cited a 
Fifth Circuit case, Rogers v. EEOC, that recognized racial 
harassment as a violation of Title VII (454 F.2d 234 (5th 
Cir. 1971)).
 9. Liberalism has been shown to be associated with greater 
support with women’s rights and feminism (Bolzendahl and 
Myers 2004; Mason and Lu 1988).
10. The causal mechanism underlying these effects is still not 
well understood, particularly given that gender composition 
of a court does not appear to affect outcomes consistently in 
other potentially gender-salient areas of the law and may 
vary across court settings. See Kenney (2008) for a discus-
sion of the limitations of this research.
11. While it would be ideal to examine only first adoptions, there 
are not enough observations (n = 11) to analyze these in a 
systematic way. All circuits adopted the hostile environment 
standard by 1989, with the first adoption occurring in 1981.
12. Some circuits had adopted the “reasonable woman” or “rea-
sonable victim” standard, in response to criticism that the 
“reasonable person” standard was too lenient and accommo-
dating toward harassers. (For an excellent discussion of this 
alternative standard, see Bartlett and Harris 1998, 509-13.)
13. Subjects that do not fail during the time period under obser-
vation are considered right censored; ordinary least squares 
(OLS) cannot provide accurate estimates in this situation 
because it does not distinguish between cases that are 
uncensored and those that are right-censored (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). Scott and Bell (1999) also 
note the advantages of survival analysis for the study of 
policy diffusion, pointing out methodological difficulties 
with logit models (e.g., not accounting for duration depen-
dence) and time series models (e.g., loss of degrees of free-
dom and possibility of perfect prediction).
14. All models in the analysis were estimated using robust stan-
dard errors and the Breslow method for ties. Additionally, we 
calculated the Schoenfeld test statistic to determine whether 
the proportional hazard assumption held for the models 
included here. In all models estimated, the Schoenfeld test 
did confirm that the hazard rate was proportional across the 
circuit-year observations (prob > chi2 = .900).
15. For a thorough discussion of multiple (or repeated) events 
models, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), especially 
158-62.
16. The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of 
Kevin Baggett at the Louisiana State University Hebert Law 
Center in accessing the Westlaw database. The case list was 
compared against a legal casebook on gender and the law as 
a validity check (Bartlett and Harris 1998).
17. This measure is drawn from the Multi-User Database on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals (Songer 1997).
18. Because panel deliberations are closed to the public, we are 
unable to observe the role that female judges had in crafting 
opinions, so this measure serves as a proxy. In addition, we 
do not include dummy variables for the Clarence Thomas 
hearings or the issuance of EEOC guidelines because there 
are not enough cases after the Thomas hearings or before the 
issuance of the guidelines to provide adequate variance for 
model estimation.
19. The case dispositions included in this variable were reverse, 
reverse and remand, vacate and remand, and vacate. If a 
decision was affirmed in part but reversed in part, it was not 
included.
20. We considered using the number of attorneys as a proxy for 
litigiousness, but data were not consistently available in all 
states for the time period of this study.
21. We also included a dummy variable for the participation of 
the EEOC as an amicus curiae. However, this variable failed 
to achieve statistical significance and did not change the 
results for the other independent variables, so we opted to 
omit it in order to preserve degrees of freedom.
22. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of James 
Goldweber at the EEOC.
23. The order in which circuits first addressed the hostile envi-
ronment standard was as follows: DC, Eleventh, Third, 
Fourth, Eighth, Seventh, Sixth, Fifth, Tenth, First, Ninth, and 
Second. The sequence of adoption is unrelated to the raw 
number and the proportion of women judges in each circuit.
24. We report coefficients and hazard ratios for all variables. 
The coefficient does not have a conventional interpretation 
but is used to evaluate magnitude of statistical impact as 
well as to calculate the hazard ratio. Hazard ratios above 1.0 
indicate that cases meeting a particular criterion are more 
likely to adopt the innovation in question. For instance, a 
hazard ratio of 1.6 indicates that a circuit possessing the 
variable characteristic is 60 percent more likely to adopt the 
policy than other circuits, while a hazard ratio of .75 indi-
cates that a circuit is 25 percent less likely to adopt the 
policy than other circuits.
25. The EEOC participated as an amicus in only seven cases, 
followed with two cases each by the Women’s Legal 
Defense Fund and Equal Rights Advocates. By and large, 
the counsel listed as representing female plaintiffs appeared 
to be local counsel, given the location of their offices and 
the fact that they did not appear in multiple cases.
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